outweigh the benefits. Furthermore, the case of Kosovo unmistakably demonstrates that, unless people of European descent are threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale the "more civilized" nations of the North, and the international organizations which they control, are reluctant to expend human and tangible resources to save lives. This is especially true with respect to the "Dark Continent," where the international community spent $0.11 a day per refugee in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, compared to an approximate $1.50 a day per refugee in Kosovo. 6 Such disparities lead one to conclude that race and geo-politics are as much determining factors as national strategic interests when it comes to international peace and security, especially as it relates to Africa.
Notwithstanding, perhaps, European and American forces should not be employed for peace-keeping in Africa, but rather provide tangible resources such as logistics, reconnaissance, and communications support to African peace-enforcers, as the records of the former in Africa are at best dismal. On this point, one analyst comments, It seems that every peacekeeping operation has had its share of horror stories: US soldiers offending Muslim values by skinnydipping in Somalia; Canadians torturing and murdering Somali civilians; Dutch peacekeepers 'luring Bosnian children into a field to check for land mines by throwing sweets into the area'; and UNTAC's Bulgarian contingent becoming involved in prostitution and smuggling. Although professional conduct should be a fundamental part of all peacekeeping operations, its importance is greater in internal conflicts because of the greater level of civilian interaction. In cases of delivering humanitarian assistance or conducting elections, the peacekeeping force must establish a high level of trust with the target country's civilians, and this trust can be destroyed for the entire force because of deplorable acts by a few peacekeepers. 7 Given the enormous problems that European and American U.N. peacekeepers have had in Africa, and considering the demonstrably high degree of reluctance of western governments to take part in future peace-keeping activities on the continent, African governments must take the leadership role in dealing with the brutal realities 6 [Vol 11:39 of African conflict. 8 As the peace negotiations in Burundi illustrate, when western nations disagree with African regional actors, 9 "they are often unwilling to defer to the African consensus."
10 Therefore, perhaps more so than at any other time in the past, African governments need to be committed to establishing and enhancing local, subregional, and regional mechanisms to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict in Africa.
The present Article seeks to examine the preparedness of certain African regional actors to protect displaced persons in times of armed conflict, and to prescribe formulas to strengthen the capabilities of such actors. The objective is to assess the conflict maintenance capacities of African regional actors and their partners to provide physical and legal protection to displaced persons in times of armed conflict, and likewise to recommend strategies to increase protection.
11 I argue that African regional actors have a significant role to play in protecting the rights of displaced persons, but in order to effectively prevent, manage, and resolve conflict they must develop and institute new, and strengthen and adhere to pre-existing protective mechanisms and legal instruments. Such analyses are important due to the growing numbers of refugees and other persons of concern, 12 which according to the Office of the U. 9. A regional actor may be defined as any regional organization, agency, entity, or arrangement made up of and empowered by states to represent their interests, whether economic, political, military, social, cultural, or religious.
10. Stephen R. Weissman, Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, 1998, No. 22 at 19. 11. Protection may broadly be defined as a concept which "encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e., human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law)." International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Background Paper for the 3rd Workshop on Protection, held in Geneva, Jan. [18] [19] [20] 1999 . This includes physical and legal protection, as well as the specific rights and obligations provided for in general human rights and humanitarian law and the OAU Refugee Convention for the benefit of refugees and other persons of concern.
12. The term "other persons of concern" is a notion frequently used by UNHCR to refer to specific groups of persons not falling within the ordinary mandate of UNHCR including asylumseekers, returnees, IDPs, and stateless persons. For further information see UNHCR, 1998 GLOBAL REPORT: ACHIEVEMENTS AND IMPACT (1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/gr98/toc. htm>, and UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA (1997) <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/state/97/toc.htm>.
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CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, AND RESOLUTION 43 lion. 13 As Cohen and Deng observe, the plight of African refugees and IDPs "not only poses a humanitarian challenge but also threatens the security and stability of countries, regions, and through a chain effect, the international system of which they are an integral part." 14 In this context, the Article first analyzes the key components of an effective conflict maintenance system; secondly, critically assesses the conflict prevention, management, and resolution capacities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); finally, it offers comprehensive suggestions and solutions to moniter and avert population displacement and protect displaced persons. The fields of inquiry are conflict and security studies, public international law, political science, and international relations. The scope of the study is limited to an appraisal of the protection policies and capacities of such regional actors in internal conflicts, 15 the general character of their relations with the United Nations (U.N.), and more specifically their association with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR).
Considering the vast amount of literature on the subject, the numerous issues, and the various perspectives that this topic engenders, the foregoing description is modest given the enormity of the problem, and the method, though capacious, is sagacious. The general nature of the Article is prescriptive rather than investigative, as it is generally recognized by academics and practitioners alike that the root causes of population displacement in Africa are related to internal conflict. As the former Director of the OAU Bureau for Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs observed, the situation of refugees and displaced persons may be attributed to armed conflicts, civil strife, political and ethnic intolerance, human rights abuses, natural disasters, or calamities and poverty. 16 Hence, an elucidation 44 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:39 of the causes of such conflict in the context of forcibly displaced persons would only detract from an analysis of the protection capacities and strategies of African regional actors to prevent displacement and protect refugees and IDPs. The term displaced persons is used to make reference to refugees, internally displaced persons and other persons of concern 17 who have been displaced due to internal deadly conflict, gross violations of human rights, militarism, socio-economic inequalities, and lack of good governance and democratic institutions.
18 Special attention will not be given to any category of displacement as the analysis is primarily concerned with examining the institutional capacities of African regional actors to protect displaced persons in times of war. 19 The focal point of discussion, however, will center on internal deadly conflict, since it has been responsible for producing the greatest number of conflict-related fatalities and forcibly displaced persons over the past several years.
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The underlying concept of regional collective protection connotes the inability of a state to protect its citizenry. Hence, inquiries into the causes of deadly conflict and their progeny, coerced popula-17. For the purposes of this Article the term "refugee" shall be defined as "every person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, art.1(1), 8 I.L.M. 1288. The term "internally displaced person" shall be defined as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. tion movements, are generally state-centered, 21 meaning that the problem of refugees and IDPs in Africa is often viewed by academics and policy-makers alike as one that only concerns states that are directly affected by displaced persons, as opposed to sub-regional, regional, and international state actors. As a result, state-centric approaches do not provide adequate insight into how third party intermediaries (e.g., the United Nations or OAU) may provide protection to displaced persons during times of armed conflict. This is particularly true when the primary culprit is the government of a state (e.g., Iraq), or when a government has collapsed due to armed conflict and is unable to maintain itself in power or protect its citizens (e.g., Liberia and Sierra Leone), or likewise, when a government does not exist (e.g., Somalia). In these scenarios, state-centric analyses become moot because the state can no longer be viewed as the referent object of protection. State-centered approaches fall under the rubric of conflict prevention as they seek to address conflict at its root, by averting conflict altogether through, for example, structural or institutional reform. The concepts of conflict management and resolution, however, are broadly concerned with stopping conflict once it has begun and, in this context, preventing mass population movements. Hence, the challenge is to determine how external third party actors, specifically African regional actors, can provide physical and legal protections, food, shelter, and rapid medical attention to displaced persons in crisis situations.
The following section will discuss the concepts of conflict prevention, management, and resolution as separate but interdependent components and processes of a comprehensive conflict maintenance system, which African states and regional actors must institute in order to provide ample protection to displaced persons.
II. CONFLICT MAINTENANCE AS A PREVENTIVE AND PROTECTIVE STRATEGY
The most effective and sustainable way to prevent coerced population movements and protect displaced persons is to establish comprehensive conflict maintenance systems at the local, national, regional, and international levels. A comprehensive conflict maintenance system is one that has three functional objectives: conflict pre-21. The terms state-centered and state-centric will be used interchangeably. They refer to overly structural and or institutional approaches to conflict management that do not give due attention to contingent factors, i.e., individual political actors.
vention, management, and resolution (see Table 1 below). Again, the aims are neither static nor separate but rather are interdependent processes, which form a unique and sometimes intelligible continuum. Although there are wide spectrums of opinion regarding the precise meanings of the concepts of conflict prevention, management, and resolution, it is more useful to define them in political and operational terms.
The political aim of conflict prevention should be to avert conflict altogether, or at the least to defuse it in its initial stages, with trust-building, coalition building, and negotiated settlements being key objectives. 22 From an operational standpoint this may be done in a variety of ways, most notably through traditional and untraditional preventive diplomacy or preventive deployment. 23 The displacement objective should be to ensure that adequate state protection exists for populations affected by conflict. No conflict prevention mechanism can be sustained, however, in the absence of viable early warning and risk assessment systems. 24 Information attainment and analysis are perhaps the most important functions of any conflict maintenance system and are crucial for crisis prevention, as they provide decisionmakers with crucial information to enable them to take decisive actions before conflict escalates resulting in coerced population movements.
Conflict management is the most important conflict maintenance process because it is the one most integral to the physical and legal protection of displaced people, and in this context works to prevent the escalation of refugee flows and IDPs. The political objective of conflict management is to promote trust and confidence, and with respect to displaced persons, ensure peace, security, and stability to allow for voluntary repatriation and internal replacement. 25 The displacement aim should be to minimize the escalation of conflict and provide humanitarian assistance and other case specific solutions. The operational objective should be to establish order through in- tense preventive diplomacy, coercive sanctions, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement or humanitarian intervention. This requires political will and resources because in situations of armed conflict the human and tangible risks may be costly. Conflict resolution is the last conflict maintenance process and represents the linchpin to sustainable peace. The political objective of conflict resolution should be to maintain and sustain peace by building and re-building civil society and state institutions to allow for transparency and accountability. The displacement aim should be to negotiate agreements on the return of displaced persons to their home states and/or places of habitual residence. Therefore, the operational objectives likewise should be first to monitor impartially cease-fire agreements and other accords, and also to preserve peace and security to allow for repatriation, demobilization, and the development of civil society and government structures, including political and judicial processes to bring about justice and reconciliation. While the primary purpose for establishing a conflict maintenance system is to avert conflict, the underlying aim of conflict aversion is to safeguard the rights of people by minimizing the effects of conflict upon them. Hence, any viable conflict maintenance system must be principally concerned with protecting war-affected populations. The effectiveness of such systems will ultimately be judged according to their ability to safeguard internationally recognized rights. As one analyst notes, states unquestionably "constitute the primary nexus when it comes to security for individuals and groups." 37 When states fail or are unable to prevent, manage, or resolve internal conflict and fulfill their principal function of providing protection to civilians from rebels and insurgents (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola), they may be responsible for committing illegal acts. Beyani highlights four principles, which are of particular relevance in this regard: 38 (a) A State is only liable for the wrongful acts of rebels if it was at fault in failing to prevent or suppress the rebellion as such. The liability of the State is qualified because rebels hold no official position in the State and they are beyond the control of the State.
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(b) Although no arbitral tribunal has ever found a State guilty of negligence to prevent a rebellion, there is clear inference in the decisions of certain tribunals that the defendant State would only have been liable if it had failed to take steps to prevent a rebellion that was reasonably foreseeable.
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(c) A State is under a duty to act with diligence or to take reasonable steps to suppress a rebellion. The method of doing so falls within the discretion of the State and may involve the proportionate use of force or a negotiated settlement with the rebels. (d) A successful rebel movement is responsible for illegal acts committed by its forces during the conflict and assumes responsibility for the wrongful acts of the State.
41
The above principles only concern states' liability for failure to forestall the wrongful acts of insurgents; however, they are especially relevant to the legal obligations of governments to safeguard the wellbeing and rights of displaced persons during armed conflict. 42 The international protective regime would also appear to require that states provide protections to the citizens of foreign countries engulfed in war or impacted by some other malady. refugees: the individual's right to seek asylum; the right of nonrefoulement; and the concept of voluntary repatriation. 44 Article 1(2) of the Convention "widens the term refugee and includes people who are displaced as a result of warfare or other civil disorder; as well as due to the conditions of famine and natural catastrophes." 45 Regardless of whether coerced population movements are a manifestation of the acts of rebels, repressive regimes, or alternative forms of civil strife, under international law, states have a de jure obligation to act reasonably to protect the rights of their citizens and in certain instances those of other states. When states fail to act responsibly or are inhibited from taking appropriate action, under international law, the international community as a whole is obliged to take corrective action. 46 This contention is also supported by Principle 5 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which states that "all authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to the displacement of persons." 47 Customary international law comprises standards that are binding upon all states, most notably the right to life, self-determination, the prohibitions against slavery, genocide, torture, cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, and racial and systematic patterns of discrimination. 48 Customary international law also embodies stronger protective norms referred to as jus cogens, which are peremptory norms accepted and recognized by the international community as norms from which no derogation is permitted and that can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general character. These norms sit atop the hierarchy of international law, pre-empting both conflicting treaties and customary international law, 49 [Vol 11:39 to ensure that such norms are not violated. 50 If or when they are violated, states may employ lawful means to remedy the situation, which may for example include preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, and humanitarian intervention. 51 Today, states may no longer hide behind the cloaks of state sovereignty, noninterference, and territorial integrity. The law de lege lata appears to permit humanitarian intervention to protect displaced persons in three instances: when there are human rights abuses in a state that are so egregious as to violate the jus cogens norms of international law; when a state has collapsed and is withering into a state of anarchy; and when intervention is necessary to safeguard democracy when a democratic government has been violently and illegally dislodged against the will of its domestic population. 52 Although the above criteria concern the customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention and hence unilateralcollective action by states (i.e., collective action without U.N. Security Council authorization), the United Nations may likewise invoke a right to humanitarian intervention by taking action under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. When states cannot or will not protect displaced persons (e.g., Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone), the responsibility to do so falls on the whole of the international community. The responsibility exists, even if it requires interfering in the internal affairs of states and breaching classical notions of state sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity. In Africa, there are several examples of humanitarian intervention by regional actors (e.g., ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, MISAB in the Central African Republic (CAR), and SADC in Lesotho) and the United Nations (e.g., Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and CAR). With exception to the SADC intervention in Lesotho, all of these interventions were supported by the whole of the international community.
The international community, the United Nations in particular, has a gloomy record of safeguarding the rights of forcibly displaced 50. See Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), supra note 46. 51. Humanitarian intervention can be taken to mean intervention in a state involving the threat of force (U.N. action in Haiti) or use of force (U.N. action in Iraq and Somalia or ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone), where the intervenor deploys armed forces and, at the least, makes clear that it is willing to use force if its operation is resisted as it attempts to alleviate conditions in which a substantial part of the population of a state is threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale. African states have also demonstrated a keen willingness to take a leadership role in the prevention, management, and resolution of African conflict. Hence, when states (i.e., the international community) fail to fulfill their erga omes obligations by safe-guarding the rights of displaced persons in Africa, questions concerning states' responsibility to take preventive and protective action become moot. Perhaps the more appropriate question should be who is interested in and best suited in this regard? The cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Lesotho arguably show that Africans are the most committed and best suited to safeguard the rights of Africans. 55 The latter cases also illustrate, however, that Africans lack the resources and logistical capacities to provide adequate protection.
The following three sections will examine the capability of African regional actors to provide physical and legal protection to displaced people, and discuss how those organizations and the United Nations and its specialized agencies, notably UNHCR, UNHCHR, and UNDP, and other international organizations can work together to enhance their protective mandates. Conflict prevention should be the first phase of any comprehensive conflict maintenance system. 56 Crisis early warning and risk assessment are the most essential components of any viable conflict preventive scheme, and preventive diplomacy and deployment are the most important functional features of conflict prevention. Most African states and regional actors do not have conflict early warning and risk assessment capabilities. Nonetheless, this has not deterred them from engaging in preventive diplomacy, deployment, and peacekeeping. Today, African regional actors like the OAU are attempting to develop systematic conflict prevention capacities. In the past, the majority of their time was spent "dealing with the effects of conflict, rather than preventing situations of tension from growing into full blown conflict."
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African leaders have had to rely on preventive diplomacy and peace-enforcement as the primary means of conflict mitigation, the former being most applicable prior to armed conflict and the latter when it has reached an intolerable state. Yet, it is the period between these two stages when displaced persons are most vulnerable. Thus, rapid preventive deployment (with an operational capacity to upgrade to peace-keeping) may serve as a deterrent to and buffer between low intensity conflict and full blown warfare, which is the primary cause of displacement. In light of this, conflict prevention must not be seen as an independent process, but rather as one which is inextricably linked to conflict management and resolution. On this issue, one analyst notes that the "distinction between conflict resolution/management and conflict prevention is not clear-cut, but that these involve instruments that are part of a continuum of activities which are undertaken at different points of the life cycle of a con- Arguably, the OAU has been the most active African regional actor in the area of conflict prevention. 59 It has been more operative in African preventive diplomacy than the ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, United Nations, and donor nations. For example, OAU's diplomatic efforts in the Congo (Brazzaville) "helped mediate a peace treaty between the opposing sides in a conflict resulting from disputed general elections." 60 Moreover, its labors in Rwanda enlisted support from the former President of Tanzania and eminent African statesman, Julius Nyerere, which eventually led to the Arusha Accord in 1993. 61 Notwithstanding, there is no international consensus as to its effectiveness in this area.
Since the end of the Cold War the OAU has arguably employed the art with mixed outcomes in Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Western Sahara. In 1993, it established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) to employ a systems approach to conflict maintenance.
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The primary objective of the Mechanism is to anticipate and prevent conflicts.
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The MCPMR is built around a Central Organ with the Secretary-General and Secretariat as its operational arm, and is composed of the states' members of the Bureau of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government as well as Ministers and Ambassadors accredited to the OAU, who are elected annually. 64 The Mechanism has been preoccupied with conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy as opposed to conflict management and resolution, because averting conflict is far less expensive than attempting to forestall it.
According to OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, in times of armed conflict the primary aim of the Mechanism is to "undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate conflict resolution, and it could mount and deploy civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration." 65 As previously alluded to, however, the OAU is hindered by its lack of an operable intelligence gathering and evaluation capacity, and thus "the OAU will need an effective early-warning system to support the MCPMR." 66 Without such a capacity the MCPMR lacks empirical legitimacy and functional operability, both of which are needed to enable OAU decision-makers to make sound decisions and take decisive action.
Although the OAU intends to develop early warning and risk assessment capacities, 67 its inability to adequately predict and respond to conflict has, in contravention of the spirit of the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969, inhibited its ability to provide protection to displaced persons and prevent population displacement. The main purpose of the OAU Convention is to establish a firm legal standard for refugees and ensure their safety and security, thus decreasing the likelihood of mass population displacement. 68 However, this principal function cannot be fulfilled unless host states and humanitarian actors are supplied with sound information about the location, direction, number, and immediate needs of refugees and internally displaced persons. The failure of the OAU to develop such capabilities has greatly hindered its ability to assist displaced people and others affected by armed conflict.
Similarly, preventive deployment of civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring requires reliable intelligence, reconnaissance, and logistics capacities. Preventive deployment is not peace-keeping, but rather an extension of preventive diplomacy, which typically follows low intensity conflict but precedes high intensity warfare. Intelligence gathering, logistical planning, and conflict deterrence are major aims of preventive deployment. Although the OAU lacks such abilities, its relatively successful observation mission in Burundi in December of 1993, 69 illustrates its willingness and ability to launch preventive deployment missions. Hence, when the OAU develops early warning, risk assessment, and logistical capabilities, it will be in a stronger position to protect displaced persons and will attain greater legitimacy and trust from its Member States, bilateral do- nors, and other regional actors concerning its standing as an authentic peace broker.
B. Conflict Management
It has historically been the practice of the Member States of the OAU to strictly adhere to the international law principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and inviolability of inherited borders. The consent and cooperation of parties to a conflict has been a prerequisite to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. 70 As a result, the OAU has refrained from employing coercive methods to forestall internal conflict. This practice has had serious ramifications for the protection of IDPs in particular, where the "primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs lies with national authorities."
71 However, the complex nature of internal conflict has meant that domestic authorities have not always been the ideal patrons of IDPs. 72 Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the OAU, with exception to intensified preventive diplomacy, has been its incapacity to deal with the effects of conflict-i.e., manage conflict-as evidenced by its 1981 mission in Chad. 73 Nevertheless, the institution of the OAU MCPMR appears to be the first step toward developing such a capacity.
Provision 9 of the Declaration establishing the MCPMR states that "[c]onflicts have forced millions of our people into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope." 74 Consequently, forcibly displaced persons were clearly a key consideration in the establishment of the MCPMR. Moreover, Provision 15 of the Declaration states that in times of armed conflict the Mechanism will be responsible for undertaking "peace-making and peace-building functions" in order to facilitate the resolution of conflict. 75 Since the MCPMR does not define the terms "peace-making and peace-building," the Declaration gives some guidance as to their scope within the field of conflict prevention, management, and resolution:
In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed. In setting these objectives, we are fully convinced that prompt and decisive action in these spheres will, in the first instance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, and where they do inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or generalised conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations. . . .
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Under Provision 15 it thus appears that peace-making and peacebuilding fall somewhere between conflict prevention and conflict management. Although there is no concurrence among scholars and practitioners as to the exact meanings of the terms peace-making, peace-building, and peace-keeping, the above passage suggests that the OAU established the MCPMR to engage in conflict prevention and resolution rather than management. Nonetheless the OAU empowered the MCPMR to "prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they occur," 77 or stated differently, "stop [conflict from] degenerating into intense or generalised conflicts," 78 which would inevitably require action that falls within the rubric of conflict management (see Table 1 above). The OAU, however, has yet to specify what type of action this may entail. Furthermore, taken together, Provisions 15 and 16 of the Declaration indicate that peacekeeping is an unpopular conflict maintenance option, which if pursued, should only be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. 79 Hence a dichotomy exists in the sense that the OAU sanctioned the MCPMR to stop conflict and protect displaced persons on the one hand, but has discouraged it from doing so on the other. Moreover, the MCPMR does not have the requisite human and tangible resources to prevent coerced population movements or to protect displaced persons. Therefore, with exception to intensified preventive diplomacy, the OAU clearly has no viable conflict management capability. Nonetheless, it is taking measures to strengthen its capacity to act and build upon the example contained in the newly established ECOWAS Mechanism according to which the In order for the OAU to effectively manage conflict and ensure that its member states understand and fulfill their legal obligations under the OAU Refugee Convention, it will need to reconsider its political position vis-à-vis the new international system of peace and security. Its classical and conservative adherence to the international principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference, must be revisited. This means that "nothing short of an overhaul of the Charter of the OAU will cure the anomalies afflicting the organization," 81 which will require progressive political leadership and visionassets that it does not have in abundance.
It will also need to develop an enforcement regime and capacity or likewise enter into partnerships with states or regional actors that can carry out peace-keeping and peace-enforcement functions on its behalf. Unless the OAU is able to make changes along these lines, it will be unable to ensure compliance with any other legal regime (e.g., international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law) aimed at protecting the rights of refugees and internally displaced persons. Consequently, displaced persons will not receive the protections to which they are legally entitled, and the OAU's ability to curb conflict will remain minimal. As a result, Member States will continue to question its capacity to genuinely mitigate conflict or act as a conflict broker.
C. Conflict Resolution
The OAU has demonstrated its willingness and ability to engage in conflict resolution. It has partaken in various post-conflict peacebuilding activities including confidence-building measures, with varying degrees of success in Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, and Western Sahara, and the monitoring of elections in the Comoros, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Although the OAU's budget is insufficient compared to the needs of the African continent, it has been arguably successful at mobilizing resources and calling attention to issues of international concern. For example, during the OAU Council of Minis- In like manner, the OAU appealed to the United Nations and the whole of the international community not to recognize the illegal junta in Sierra Leone. In October of the same year, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1132, which placed a petroleum and arms embargo on the country and imposed travel restrictions on the military junta and their families. 83 Moreover, the resolution permitted ECOWAS to enforce its terms. 84 OAU action in this respect must not be ignored, as it signals significant political maturity, and demonstrates its ability and commitment to utilize its resources and leverage to curb international public opinion to safeguard democratic institutions and forestall conflict. 85 Its outspokenness in the case of Sierra Leone represents a precedent and perhaps a shift in policy in this regard. Notwithstanding, the OAU's history of inaction has lead many analysts to argue that it has failed to put theory into practice on issues concerning state's responsibility, human rights, and the rule of law, 86 and as a result, has been generally ineffective in the area of conflict resolution. 87 The fact remains that the OAU, like NATO and the United Nations, is an organization made up of and directed by its Member States, and not a supranational entity entrusted with powers to police its members. Ultimately, it will represent the interests of its members and likewise be shaped by their mores, values, and characteristics. This may explain why, at times, the OAU's policies appear protective and conservative on the one hand, and transparent and liberal on the other. Such a dichotomy is the manifestation of the various political characteristics of its leaders, ranging from autocratic, militaristic, and neo-patrimonial, to democratic. Until the OAU be- comes consistent in the way that it adheres to domestic and international laws and norms, refugees and IDPs and returnees in Africa will not receive the protections for which they are legally and morally entitled.
IV. SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MAINTENANCE: ECOWAS, SADC, AND IGAD
A. Conflict Prevention
The ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD have the same conflict preventive disabilities as the OAU because they too lack early warning and risk assessment capacities. The IGAD, and to some extent ECOWAS, lack reconnaissance and logistical capacities, whereas SADC has access to such capabilities and other military assets through South Africa, and to some extent Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, there are no provisions in the SADC Organ for Politics, Defense and Security (1995), 88 the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region (1997), 89 or the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (MCPMRPS) (1998), 90 that make specific reference to refugees and internally dis- Nevertheless, it could be argued that other provisions in the ECOWAS and SADC mechanisms, which emphasize human rights and humanitarian law, are intended to "cover" or take into consideration the plight of displaced populations. Furthermore, Provisions 8(d) and 9 of the Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action which was adopted at the OAU First Ministerial Conference on Human Rights in Africa emphasize the importance of population displacement in Africa. 92 This, however, does not alter the fact that the ECOWAS and SADC charters, subsequent protocols, and other instruments do not make specific reference to refugees or internally displaced persons. In this regard, even though IGAD's protective capacity is still in an embryonic stage, the specific references in its instruments to IDPs and refugees demonstrate its commitment to the latter, and should serve as an example for the ECOWAS and SADC.
SADC has been the least effective African regional actor in the areas of preventive diplomacy and deployment. Its botched intervention in Lesotho 93 and its failed peace-making efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) represent the only authentic SADC attempts to forestall conflict. 94 On the other hand, ECOWAS's diplomatic and military missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau were arguably better. In this respect, Ramcharan comments that ECOWAS must be credited with one of the first attempts in the history of international peace-keeping at the use of peace-keeping forces for preventive purposes, something that was later to earn the United Nations credit with its preventive deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYOM). In the case of Liberia, however, it may be argued that ECOWAS prolonged the Liberian Civil War (1989-1997) causing more harm than good to displaced persons. 96 Alternatively, its intervention in Sierra Leone saved thousands of lives by providing a buffer between the combatants and hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced persons. Still, ECOWAS has not succeeded in forestalling conflict by purely diplomatic means (e.g., Guinea-Bissau), which may signal a fault in its conflict prevention capacity or may be a result of the harsh brand of conflicts with which it has been forced to contend. Similarly, although IGAD has been intimately involved in conflict mediation in Somalia and Sudan, 97 the "on again, off again" dynamics of those conflicts raise questions about IGAD's conflict prevention capacity in the area of preventive diplomacy. In view of this, the ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD need to work diligently to strengthen their capabilities in this area.
B. Conflict Management
As previously mentioned, conflict management is the most important conflict maintenance process with respect to the protection of displaced persons. 98 Lately, the OAU and IGAD have become more concerned with developing and enhancing their conflict prevention capabilities, as both of them are in the process of establishing conflict early warning and risk assessment capabilities. In the past, African regional actors have engaged in peace-keeping to monitor cease-fires (e.g., OAU in Rwanda and Burundi), and partaken in peaceenforcement operations (e.g., SADC in Lesotho) and humanitarian interventions (e.g., ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and GuineaBissau) in order to halt warfare, restore democracy, and establish security and stability in troubled states.
ECOWAS has far more experience protecting displaced persons via peace-keeping and peace-enforcement than the OAU, SADC, and IGAD combined.
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Its Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has evolved from an ad hoc grouping of states into a permanent humanitarian enforcement mechanism, the MCPMRPS. The MCPMRPS may evolve to be the most comprehensive conflict management mechanism on the African continent. The most salient features of the MCPMRPS concerning displaced persons are found in Articles 17 and 18. Article 17 calls for the establishment of a Mediation and Security Council (MSC), which in times of crisis will be "empowered to take decisions on issues of regional peace and security on behalf of the Authority of Heads of State and Government." 100 More specifically, however, Article 18 of the MCPMRPS states that the MSC may "authorise all forms of interventions, including the decision to deploy political and military missions." 101 Similarly, Article 46 states that in internal conflict situations that are sustained and maintained from within, the Mediation and Security Council may employ military missions when circumstances exist that threaten to trigger humanitarian disaster, 102 pose a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region, 103 and erupt following the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected government. 104 Under Article 45, the MCPMRPS "military instrument will be a standby force, which shall be called ECOMOG." 105 Hence, from the above provisions it is clear that under ECOWAS law, ECOMOG may lawfully be dispatched in times of armed conflict to safeguard displaced persons.
ECOWAS's consolidation of political and operational control into one body, the Mediation and Security Council, will undoubtedly result in its rendering more timely assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. Likewise, the guiding criteria in Article 46 are tailored broadly enough to include preventive enforcement missions aimed at averting the conditions responsible for producing displaced persons amidst, for example, low intensity armed conflict. From a legal, political, and perhaps military perspective, when the MCPMRPS is fully instituted it will have the most sophisticated conflict management capacity on the African continent. If the present capability of ECOWAS is measured by its recent operation in Guinea-Bissau, however, its operational proficiency clearly must evolve to complement the theoretical ambitions of the MCPMRPS. Still, with the advent of democracy in West Africa's only hegemony, Nevertheless, there is an overarching non-interventionist tone to the Protocol, which may be a result of geopolitical tensions and rivalry between Zimbabwe and South Africa, as neither country subscribes to the idea of extending the other authority to invade its territory during times of conflict. Whatever the case may be, under the terms of the Protocol, SADC may not take enforcement action to avert conflict or likewise prevent coerced population movements and safeguard displaced populations without the consent of the government of the state in crisis. As alluded to earlier, this type of policy would appear to be counter-productive when the state is the referent object of oppression. In this sense, SADC's institutional commitment to prevent forced population movements and protect displaced populations is questionable, and certainly lags behind the ECOWAS's, in part due to the Protocol's state-centric focus. Additionally, given the problems that South Africa had maintaining peace and order in Lesotho, it would also appear to be less efficient than ECOWAS at launching peace-keeping operations. 116 Nevertheless, with South Africa at the helm, SADC currently possesses the greatest functional and operational peace-keeping and peace-enforcement capacity in Africa.
C. Conflict Resolution
The OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD have engaged in conflict resolution with varying degrees of success. The OAU and ECOWAS would appear to be the most active in this respect. However, again, due to the technological and military assets at its disposal, SADC would appear to have the greatest capability to engage in long-term conflict resolution. Yet, if its leaders can learn from the mistakes of the OAU, ECOWAS, and SADC, IGAD will be in a position to become an effective conflict resolution broker. Notwithstanding, all four suffer from limited resources, a difficulty which has heavily impacted their ability to fruitfully engage in this area. Again, the ECOWAS has been the most operative regional actor in conflict resolution. In contrast, SADC has only had to deal with the crisis in Lesotho in 1998. Recent developments in the DRC, however, are bound to test its conflict resolution capabilities. Similarly, IGAD's conflict resolution capacity is untested, as it has focused the majority of its attention on conflict prevention, through preventive diplomacy and the institution of a Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism. Still, it has engaged in laudable mediation efforts in the ongoing conflicts in Somalia and the Sudan.
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The ECOWAS has engaged in post conflict peace-building activities in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. In all three situations it conducted security, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, election monitoring functions, and confidence-building measures and post-conflict reconstruction and development activities. Although warfare has come to an end in Liberia and Sierra Leone and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons have begun to repatriate and return to their places of habitual residence, the ECOWAS has not yet established structures that bring about genuine justice and reconciliation. Similar to the OAU, SADC, and IGAD, ECOWAS has been preoccupied with creating the necessary conditions for democratization through free and fair elections rather than dealing with the societal manifestations of warfare. In this context, it has adopted a Western approach to peace-making and fallen victim to the contradictions of liberal democracy, as evidenced by its support for the 7 July 1999 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone.
118
The agreement essentially empowers war criminals to rule over war victims by giving them de jure authority, i.e., key cabinet positions in government. It subverts the domestic populations' right to selfdetermination and abridges their domestic and international right to bring claims against combatants for war crimes and crimes against humanity by granting the former general amnesty. [Vol 11:39 of this nature is by design cosmetic, and to the extent that history can shed light on future events, conflict will inevitably resume in Sierra Leone, as warlords have no interest in or respect for the rule of law. ECOWAS, however, is not unique is this regard since the OAU, SADC, and IGAD have yet to institute judicial mechanisms which empower war victims to bring claims against combatants for war crimes. Accordingly, there is no African mechanism that permits individual refugees to bring claims against host state governments or combatants for violating their human rights. Until such structures are instituted, the international community should question the authenticity of African governments and regional actors to tackle problems associated with the plight of displaced persons.
V. ENHANCING AFRICA'S PROTECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE CAPACITIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
THE WAY FORWARD
A. Preventing Conflict and Promoting Trust
There is no simple remedy for conflict once it manifests. Every conflict is unique. Political will and resources aside, peace ultimately depends on whether or not the parties in conflict want it. In the final analysis, peace must be internally driven. Once internal governance and preventive structures break down, conflict prevention ultimately depends on the willingness of opposing parties to accept external diplomatic intervention. Absent such commitment, warfare and its offspring, coerced population movements, may be unavoidable. As early intervention is the easiest way to avert conflict, African states and regional actors must be resolute in their commitment to institute the necessary mechanisms to engage in fruitful conflict prevention. As the discussion above highlights, they appear to be making some progress in this area, although their ability to reliably forecast conflict and proffer rapid diplomatic responses is weak. As a result, they must commit more resources to building conflict early warning, risk assessment, and rapid diplomatic deployment capabilities.
The UNHCR is in a strong position to qualitatively assist African regional actors in enhancing their protective capacities. Although it currently spends over forty percent of its resources in Africa, 120 it needs to play "a more visible advocacy role in order to convince state actors to adhere to refugee protection principles, by building principles and guidelines into the sub-regional institutional framework, and providing material and technical support to refugee related institutional mechanism." 121 In this regard, it should enter into and update on a biannual basis humanitarian based memorandums of understanding with African regional organizations, which clearly delineate their commitment to safeguarding the rights of refugees and IDPs. The Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) that the UNHCR concluded with SADC in July 1996 and IGAD in November 1997 are seminal examples in this regard.
122 These MOUs, however, are weak in that they do not include provisions that state the organization's commitment to adhere to the international protection regime (i.e., international human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law). Rule of law issues need to be featured prominently in future agreements. Pursuant to their respective articles on supplementary arrangements, 123 the SADC and IGAD Memorandums should be amended accordingly.
Moreover, the UNHCR should seek to replicate and institute its Country Information Project (COIP) and International Refugee Electronic Network (IRENE), whose purpose is to gather and share information regarding conditions in potential refugee-producing states, in the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD. 124 At the very least, the UNHCR could work with the OAU to establish such a capacity within the MCPMR and to support the creation of a continentwide information sharing system with satellite offices in each of the sub-regional organizations. This suggestion comports with the recommendation adopted at the OAU/UNHCR meeting in Khartoum, Sudan, in December 1998, which concluded that the OAU should strengthen its early warning system with the assistance of the United Nations to enable it to better monitor humanitarian developments and crises and inform its member states. 125 Such a system would also increase the UNHCR's preventive capacity by allowing it to attain, transfer and exchange information throughout the continent.
Although it might attempt too ambitious a goal, the UNHCR could assist in the creation of Humanitarian Reaction Units in the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD, similar to its Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (EPRS), which consists of fewer than ten EPRS officers. 126 The EPRS has a number of tools at its disposal. 127 The overall purpose of these officers is to "monitor regional developments, establish contingency plans, develop operational procedures for emergencies, identify training needs for personnel assigned to work on emergencies, and, most importantly, [they] are deployed to the field to lead needs-assessment missions and emergency response teams as necessary."
128 As indicated earlier, preventive deployment of this nature is important in that it demonstrates the intervenors' commitment to build trust and resolve crisis by peaceful means. It also allows for the gathering of vital information and data on the conditions and needs of displaced populations. The UNHCR could also enter into operable memorandums of understanding with African regional actors, which would allow personnel deployment for standby EPRS operations and in addition serve as liaisons between the UNHCR and their respective organizations. These actors could also seek to embark on joint missions with the EPRS or other U.N. personnel in order to establish a nexus between national, regional, and international efforts to prevent or minimize the effects of conflict on civilian populaces.
Taken together, early warning/risk assessment and preventive diplomacy/deployment are the most viable ways to forestall and minimize conflict. Early warning and risk assessment processes do not prevent coerced population movements, but rather inform operational processes aimed at this objective. In like manner, preventive deployment (emergency preparedness) is not practicable, wanting sound and reliable information and resources. In order to prevent conflict effectively, mechanisms that consolidate all four processes must be instituted. Most importantly, however, issues related to re- 
